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The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention  
Re-examined 
 
 
Abstract. This article aims to reconsider the controversial issue of the lawfulness of 
unauthorised humanitarian intervention. After providing a definition of humanitarian inter-
vention and outlining its legality under contemporary international law, it examines the most 
common arguments raised in the literature for the purpose of justifying unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. The analysis covers such topics as the powers of the UN General Assembly to 
pass resolutions on the use of force, the theories on implicit or ex post facto authorisations 
by the Security Council, the text of the UN Charter, customary international law, as well as 
an alleged conflict of peremptory norms of international law. 
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I. 
 
The prohibition of the use of force has been a fundamental principle of 
international law since the end of the Second World War. The principle forbids 
the use or threat of armed force with peremptory character for all subjects of 
international law. To the prohibition framed under Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Charter of the United Nations (UN)1		

		
in customary law2		
3 Therefore, the use of force in 
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1
 Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter: “All members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.” 
 
2
 Cf., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgement of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 
1986, para. 188, at 99. 
 
3
 A former third exception, the “enemy state” clause under Article 107 of the Charter 
has since become entirely and perpetually inapplicable. 
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our age is lawful exclusively in two cases: if the UN Security Council gives a 
prior and express authorisation under Chapter VII thereto, or if it is employed 
in exercise of the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence.4 
Evidently, the emergence of the prohibition of the use of force resulted in 
decisive changes in the direct legal environment of humanitarian intervention, 
one of the most ancient institutions of international law, as well. Owing to a 
lack of positive legal sources in this field, it is extremely difficult to define 
this phenomenon of international relations, and its description can hardly claim 
general recognition. In my view, the definition of humanitarian intervention 
valid under contemporary international law can be summarised—on the basis of 
the relevant literature—within the framework of the following set of criteria: 
 The subject of humanitarian intervention is one or more “willing” state or 
international organisation. Other actors—for example, non-governmental organi-
sations—cannot carry out such actions. The intervener acts in a relatively 
disinterested and unbiased manner. The target of intervention can only be a 
state, which does not request or consent to the intervention. The beneficiaries 
of the action are, from the viewpoint of the intervener, foreigners, as they are 
always nationals of the target state. The ground for intervention is a grave and 
widespread violation of the most fundamental, first generation human rights of 
non-political character, or guarantees of international humanitarian law 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts. Unfortunately, a fairly large 
number of victims of atrocities or of imperilled persons are also indispensable 
for the credibility of humanitarian intervention. The target state might be guilty 
of such violations either as a result of an active or a passive behaviour, but 
it may also come about that the intervention is necessitated by a state of 
anarchy developing in the wake of the collapse of state power. Furthermore, 
humanitarian intervention is of an ultima ratio nature, restricted in its goals, 
and proportional to the violations constituting its ground both with regard to 
its means and its duration. The relevant norms of international humanitarian 
law—that is, the norms relative to armed conflicts of an international 
character—have to be rigorously observed during the action. Last, but not 
least, the internal right to self-determination of the people of the target state has 
to be respected in the course of intervention, which—in my opinion—does not 
automatically rule out the possibility of an overthrow of the oppressive regime. 
 It can be observed that the definition as outlined above does not contain the 
legality of the initiation of humanitarian intervention. I think that the legality of 
commencement cannot constitute a conceptual element, since both the renowned 
representatives of the science of international law and states consider—besides 


 
4
 See, Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter. 
THE LEGALITY OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION…

 201 
  
the lawful instances—several conducts of rather questionable legality or of 
manifest unlawfulness as humanitarian interventions. In other words, an unlaw-
fully launched armed action may also be humanitarian in nature, provided that 
the essential, conjunctive conditions required for such qualification exist. It 
might be misleading that—even though the legality of commencement, and 
therefore the overall lawfulness of the intervention is not an element of the 
concept—some of the criteria mentioned in connection with the definition of 
humanitarian intervention valid in the present era of international law bear a 
legal character and presuppose a law-abiding behaviour. Such elements are, for 
example, the obligation to respect norms of humanitarian law governing 
international armed conflicts or the internal right to self-determination of the 
people of the target state. The existence of these legal conceptual elements, 
however, does not legalise an unlawfully instigated humanitarian intervention. 
These are merely preconditions for the qualification of an action as huma-
nitarian, and as such, are eligible to establish maximum its legitimacy. As the 
quality of humanitarian intervention is per se not a legal title, a self-contained 
analysis of its legality, which, however, does not concern the exact content of 
this category, appears to be sufficiently justified. 
 In line with the explanation above, it is obvious that a humanitarian 
intervention is lawful, if it is commenced in possession of a prior and express 
authorisation by the Security Council.5 The pattern of adoption of these 
authorisations is basically the same as the general scheme of adoption of other 
resolutions authorising the use of force, albeit the process carries a few special 
features at some points. The most important among these is probably that an 
authorisation to humanitarian intervention—owing to the nature of the ground 
of the action—is imaginable solely in case of a threat to international peace 
and security, the existence of which has to be, at least implicitly, by a 
reference to Chapter VII, determined by the Security Council under Article 39. 
Since humanitarian intervention is necessitated by events taking place within a 
state, the two further categories under Article 39—that is, a breach of the peace 
or acts of aggression—are irrelevant in this regard, in view of the fact that 
these imply forms of conduct arching over borders of states.7 States and 

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5
 On the lawfulness of authorisation, see, Blokker, N.: Is the Authorization 
Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of 
Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing.” European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 11. No. 3. (September 2000), 541–568. 
 
7
 Since the Charter does not define any of these notions, the Security Council has an 
extraordinarily broad discretion in the determination of the existence of a threat to the 
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. (Although the definition of aggression 
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international organisations may likewise be recipients of an authorisation, 
however they are not obliged to carry it out. Furthermore, the authorisation can 
assume the form neither of a recommendation, nor of a provisional measure, 
even though these types of action, along with non-forcible enforcement 
measures under Article 41, may be able to establish the ultima ratio character 
of humanitarian intervention. Consequently, the direct grounds, on which 
humanitarian intervention is considered lawful, are Articles 39 and 42 of the 
Charter. These may be supplemented by a reference to Chapter VIII, in the 
event of an authorisation to regional arrangements or organisations. 
 Nonetheless, the Security Council is, by reason of the lack of unanimity of 
its permanent members, often incapable of taking action for the protection of 
an oppressed population in a timely and efficient manner. Since humanitarian 
intervention, which involves the offensive use of force, cannot be classified as 
self-defence, the chance for lawful action on the part of the states willing to 
intervene is thereby extinguished. Such states face the alternative of either 
contemplating the atrocities in inertia or intervening, in knowledge of the fact 
that, in spite of their noble intentions, they will violate international law. It is 
therefore not at all surprising that a recurrent question of international law is, 
whether a so-called unilateral or unauthorised humanitarian intervention can 
nevertheless be justified, and if so, by what legal arguments. In the following, I 
shall make an attempt to provide an exhaustive answer to this question. 
 
 
II. 
 
At first sight, it seems to be possible to derive the legality of unauthorised 
humanitarian intervention from a recommendation by the General Assembly 
on the use of force, though it must be noted that this issue, in fact, raises a 
number of serious legal concerns. Two methods are available for the purpose 
of justifying that the General Assembly—even if it bypasses the Security 
Council—can lawfully make a recommendation to states on the use of force, 
including armed humanitarian intervention. One of these theories is based on 
                               
is available in the form of a General Assembly resolution, its content does not bind the 
Council.) This may be the reason why, according to some views, humanitarian intervention 
is admissible in the case of a breach of the peace, as well. See, Hilpold, P.: Sezession und 
humanitäre Intervention — völkerrechtliche Instrumente zur Bewältigung innerstaatlicher 
Konflikte? Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht, Band 54. Heft 4. (1999), 591.; Simma, B.—
Verdross, A.: Universelles Völkerrecht. Theorie und Praxis. Berlin, 1976. 584. 
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the Charter itself, whereas the other rests upon the procedure envisaged by the 
controversial “Uniting for Peace” Resolution. 
 The General Assembly is the most representative principal organ of the 
UN, given that that all member states of the Organisation are represented in it.9 
Simultaneously, it is also the organ with the largest scope of powers, although 
its activity is primarily deliberative and critical.10 The general description of 
the powers and functions of the General Assembly is set forth in Article 10 of 
the Charter.11 As the provision reflects, there is practically no segment of 
international relations, which the General Assembly is not competent to deal 
with. It should be added that the powers guaranteed under this article—as a 
consequence of Article 2, paragraph 6—exist also with respect to non-members. 
In this regard, the sole substantial limitation is specified under Article 2, 
paragraph 7, concerning the prohibition of intervention. Therefore, the General 
Assembly is not competent in issues, “which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state”. As it is known, neither human rights, nor fundamental 
guarantees of international humanitarian law qualify as matters being within 
the scope of domestic jurisdiction, thus the attending to these matters does not 
manifest itself as an intervention by the Organisation. The demonstration of 
the legality of humanitarian intervention based upon a recommendation by the 
General Assembly is, therefore, “half-accomplished”. However, the verifi-
cation of the remaining “half” is much more difficult, as it needs to be proven 
that the General Assembly can lawfully make recommendations on the use of 
force, despite that the Charter attributes the power regarding such enforcement 
measures to the Security Council in an apparently exclusionary manner.12 
 Article 10 mentions the scope of the Charter, which incorporates such 
purposes as the maintenance of international peace and security and the 
taking of “effective collective measures” to that end, as well as the promotion 
and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all.13 Furthermore, according to the same article, the General Assembly may 


 
9
 Cf., Article 9, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter. 
 
10
 Cf., Kelsen, H.: The Law of the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of Its Funda-
mental Problems. London, 1950. 199
−
200. 
 
11
 Article 10 of the UN Charter: “The General Assembly may discuss any questions or 
any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions 
of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, 
may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security 
Council or to both on any such questions or matters.“ 
 
12
 Cf., ibid.: Article 24, paragraph 2. (The second sentence of this paragraph expressis 
verbis refers to Chapter VII.) 
 
13
 See, ibid.: Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 3. 
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not only “discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present 
Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in 
the present Charter”, but may also make recommendations on any such 
questions or matters. The provision contains merely one restriction, which is 
described under Article 12: “While the Security Council is exercising in respect 
of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, 
the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that 
dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”14 
 One may easily conclude from the wording of Article 10, that the General 
Assembly can indeed make a recommendation on humanitarian intervention 
directly to the members. (Obviously, a recommendation can also be addressed to 
the Security Council and in the event of its acceptance, the Council will 
authorise the use of force in a binding resolution.) Merely on the basis of 
Article 10, it looks as if the General Assembly has to refrain from the making 
of such a recommendation, only if the Security Council is simultaneously 
dealing with the same matter. Moreover, the adoption of a recommendation is 
permitted as a sub-exception even in this case, provided that the Council 
requests the General Assembly to proceed accordingly. 
 At this point, the question pertaining to the interpretation of the phrase 
“exercising ... the functions assigned to it” as contained by Article 12, paragraph 
1, arises, since the duration of this activity indicates the beginning and the end 
of the prohibition for the General Assembly to make recommendations. In the 
beginning, the exercise of functions by the Council was deemed equivalent to 
having a specific matter on the agenda, therefore, it is probably not accidental 
that the last sentence of each substantive resolution usually reads as follows: 
“Decides to remain seized of the matter”. On the other hand, the view that 
exercising functions entails “simultaneous, actual, and active consideration” on 
the part of the Council has gradually gained ground, which, as an interpretation, 
seems to be justified by the practice of the General Assembly, as well.15 
Consequently, Article 12 contains a provisional procedural limitation that is 
immediately terminated if the Security Council so requests in a resolution, or 
convokes a special or an emergency special session of the General Assembly, 
or ceases or adjourns to deal with the matter.16 


 
14
 Ibid., Article 12, paragraph 1. 
 
15
 See, Hailbronner, K.—Klein, E.: Article 12, in: The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (ed.: Simma, B.). Oxford, 1995. 256. Concerning Article 12, paragraph 1, see 
also, Blum, Y. Z.: Eroding the United Nations Charter. Dordrecht–Boston–London, 1993. 
103–132. 
 
16
 See, Hailbronner—Klein: Article 12, 259–261. 
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 However, by making a preliminary conclusion from the interpretation of 
the text of Article 10, we have not found the ultimate answer to the question 
whether or not the General Assembly can recommend enforcement measures, 
including the use of force, under the Charter. Even though the answer is prima 
facie in the affirmative, it does not follow that other provisions of the Charter, 
or other sources of interpretation support it. Our preliminary conclusion 
seems to be contrary to Article 11, paragraph 2, which specifies the text of 
Article 10.17  
 The well-known second clause of this paragraph leaves no room for doubt 
that “action”, that is, the taking of enforcement measures,18 is admissible 
exclusively by the Security Council; consequently, the General Assembly cannot 
make such a recommendation. Furthermore, the submission of a dispute or a 
recommendation to the Council does by no means oblige it to actually take the 
action deemed necessary by the General Assembly.19 Nevertheless, Article 11, 
paragraph 2, is related to Article 10 as the specific to the general. This is 
indicated by the fact that while Article 10 contains only one limitation (Article 
12), Article 11, paragraph 2, specifies not less than three restrictions: the 
requirement of an adequate request, as a result of which the General Assembly 
cannot proceed on its own motive under this paragraph; Article 12; and in case 
action is necessary, the obligation to refer the dispute to the Security Council. 
But pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 4, “the powers of the General Assembly 
set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10”. This 
provision can be interpreted in several ways. One of the interpretations implies 
that the General Assembly is not bound by the limitations under Article 11, so 
far as it proceeds and makes a recommendation under Article 10.20 But a 
contrary interpretation is also acceptable, considering that paragraph 4 refers to 

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17
 Article 11, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter: “The General Assembly may discuss any 
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it 
by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is 
not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, 
except as provided under Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such 
questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such 
question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the 
General Assembly either before or after discussion.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
18
 See, Kelsen: op. cit. 204. 
 
19
 See, Hailbronner, K.Klein, E.: Article 11, in Simma: The Charter of the United 
Nations. op. cit. 250. 
 
20
 See, Kelsen: op. cit. 204, 207. 
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powers defined under Article 11, whereas the obligation to refer the dispute to 
the Council does not constitute a power, but rather is a procedural norm.21 
 As a further counter-argument, one could mention that the debates in the 
course of the wording of the Charter likewise reveal that the General Assembly 
cannot recommend the taking of enforcement measures. This argument cor-
responds to the position of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressed in 
its famous advisory opinion of July 20, 1962.22 Nevertheless, according to a 
remarkable point of view, this advisory opinion does not make it absolutely 
clear whether or not the General Assembly can make such a recommendation. 
According to this view, the meaning of the second clause of Article 11, 
paragraph 2, is determined by the term “enforcement”, since the word 
“action”—as confirmed by the ICJ—refers to enforcement measures. In line 
with the formal definition of this phrase, “the existence of an ‘enforcement 
action’ is not determined by the character of the action itself but by the binding 
nature of the measure taken”. Hence, the clause under deliberation limits the 
power of the General Assembly to make recommendations exclusively in case, 
if it considers that a resolution on mandatory enforcement measures has to be 
adopted by the Security Council for the settlement of a situation. Upon these 
premises one can easily draw the conclusion, supported to some extent by the 
practice of the General Assembly, that: “Therefore a non-binding recommen-
dation is not to be considered as ‘action’, so that the GA is not prevented by 
Art. 11(2) cl. 2 from recommending coercive measures. This norm only recalls 
the fact that the GA shall not take any enforcement measures binding on all 
member states.”23 In a certain way, even the ICJ affirmed this position, when it 
stated that the responsibility conferred upon the Security Council was 
“primary, not exclusive”, thus, the General Assembly was also to be concerned 
with international peace and security, what is more, its functions and powers 
were not merely hortatory.24 


 
21
 See, HailbronnerKlein: Article 11, 252. 
 
22
 “The word “action” must mean such action as is solely within the province of the 
Security Council. […] The “action” which is solely within the province of the Security 
Council is that which is indicated by the title of Chapter VII of the Charter, namely 
“Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, 165. 
 
23
 For the theory and the cited opinion, see, Hailbronner, K.—Klein, E.: Article 10, in 
Simma: The Charter of the United Nations. op. cit. 233. For a summary of the relevant 
practice of the General Assembly, see, ibid., 234. 
 
24
 See, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, 163. 
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 Pursuing this train of thought, one arrives at the conclusion that, even 
though the Security Council bears primary responsibility in the field of the 
maintenance of international peace and security, as illustrated by Article 12, 
nothing in the Charter prohibits the General Assembly to recommend the use of 
force, including the commencement of a humanitarian intervention, in exercise 
of its “secondary” or “supplementary” responsibility.25 (It is worth noting, how-
ever, that according to all indications, not even the Council is entitled to make 
a recommendation on the use of force, since the authorisation must assume the 
form of a binding resolution.26) At the same time, it also follows from the 
relevant provisions of the Charter that recommendations under Article 10 can be 
made directly to the member states, whereas recommendations under Article 
11, paragraph 2, are addressed to the states “concerned”, that is, both members 
and non-members. The General Assembly can make a recommendation to 
international organisations only indirectly, via states. 
 The derivation of the legality of humanitarian intervention from the “Uniting 
for Peace” Resolution is a solution with an equally controversial outcome. 
According to the central provision of the resolution, the General Assembly: 
 “Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there 
appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, 
the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to 
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, 
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of 
armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in 
emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. 
Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security 
Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members 
of the United Nations.”27 


 
25
 On residual powers, see, e.g. Prandler, Á.: Az ENSZ Biztonsági Tanácsa. [The UN 
Security Council] Budapest, 1974. 298–300. 
 
26
 Cf., Frowein, J. A.: Article 42, in Simma: The Charter of the United Nations. op. cit. 
614–615. 
 
27
 Uniting for Peace. G.A. Res. 377A, 302nd plen. mtg., 3 November 1950, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/377A (V), para. A. 1. Since the number of the members of the Security Council has 
been raised to fifteen, at present nine votes are necessary for the convocation of an 
emergency special session of the General Assembly. 
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At first sight, the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution seems to be an appropriate 
ground of the lawfulness of a humanitarian intervention, and it is frequently 
reflected by the relevant literature.28 Two factors, however, contradict the 
unconditional applicability of this resolution. On the one hand, its legality and 
conformity with the Charter is at least dubious, so its adoption has triggered 
extremely fierce debates both in practice and in scientific circles. Although the 
charges brought up against the resolution were to a large extent attributable to 
the international context of the Cold War, such an extension of the powers of 
the General Assembly seems somewhat perilous even from a clearly legal 
point of view. Without providing a detailed presentation of the arguments and 
counter-arguments raised in the course of these disputes,29 it can be stated that 
the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution can be taken into consideration with respect 
to the justification of humanitarian intervention, only if it qualifies as a lawful 
instrument. To put it briefly, its legality can only be demonstrated, if one 
proves that the General Assembly is entitled to recommend the use of force 

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28
 See, e.g. Abiew, F. K.: The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian 
Intervention. The Hague–London–Boston, 1999. 100. (Footnote 106); Advisory Council of 
International Affairs—Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 
Humanitarian Intervention. No. 13. The Hague, 2000. 26.; Arias, I.: Humanitarian Inter-
vention: Could the Security Council Kill the United Nations? Fordham International Law 
Journal, Vol. 23. No. 4. (April 2000), 1026.; Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo: The Kosovo Report. New York, 2000. 166, 174.; Nagy, B.: Hadban állunk? [Are 
We at War?] Élet és Irodalom, Vol. XLIII. No. 15. (16 April 1999), 3.; Pellet, A.: Brief 
Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11. 
No. 2. (2000), 390.; Reisman, W. M.: Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos. (With 
the collaboration of McDougal, M. S.), in Humanitarian Intervention and the United 
Nations (ed.: Lillich, R. B. ). Charlottesville, 1973. 175, 190. For an opposing view, see, 
Gowlland-Debbas, V.: The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in 
the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 
11. No. 2. (2000), 374.; Valki, L.: A koszovói válság és a humanitárius intervenció. [The 
Kosovo Crisis and Humanitarian Intervention] Acta Humana, No. 46–47. (2002), 157–158. 
For an intermediary view, according to which it is questionable if the unilateralism 
manifested in the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution is a legitimate substitute for collective 
measures, see, Dupuy, P.-M.: The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary 
International Law. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11. No. 1. (2000), 27. 
 
29
 On this issue, see, Andrassy, J.: Uniting for Peace. American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 50. No. 3. (July 1956), 563–582.; Kelsen, H.: Recent Trends in the Law of the 
United Nations. A Supplement to the “The Law of the United Nations”. London, 1951. 
953–990.; Prandler: op. cit., 271–276.; Woolsey, L. H.: The “Uniting for Peace” Resolution 
of the United Nations. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 45. No. 1. (January 
1951), 129–137. 
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even beyond the scope of this resolution, that is, on the basis of the Charter. 
Otherwise, the document qualifies as an unlawful amendment to the Charter,30 
and its adoption is to be considered an ultra vires act. As it follows from the 
previous part, the Charter allows for both interpretations in the context of such 
recommendations by the General Assembly, nevertheless, if the permissive 
interpretation had been absolutely correct, the adoption of the “Uniting for 
Peace” Resolution probably would not have been necessary. At the same time, 
one cannot fail to observe that the once so fierce debates have almost entirely 
diminished, and despite the concerns regarding lawfulness, the resolution has 
been integrated into the practice of the UN. Although, the instrument had been 
used to confront an aggression during the Korean War, afterwards it has rather 
served the purposes of peace-keeping or the convocation of emergency special 
sessions.31 Notwithstanding, it can reasonably be assumed that in case the 
resolution was applied for the justification of the use of force, the debates 
would flare up again. 
 The applicability of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution for the justification 
of humanitarian intervention is also undermined by the following phrase of the 
cited provision: “including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of 
aggression the use of armed force when necessary”. A recommendation on the 
use of force is, consequently, permissible exclusively in the gravest situations, in 
case of a breach of the peace or acts of aggression, whereas in the event of a 
threat to the peace, which embraces the violations of human rights or 
humanitarian law necessitating humanitarian intervention, it is inadmissible.32 In 
view of this conclusion, the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, regardless of the 
issue of its legality, seems to be entirely inapplicable. One “escape route” is, 
nevertheless, conceivable: if the emergency special session is convoked at a 
time, when the Security Council, due to the lack of the unanimity of its 
permanent members, is not even able to adopt a resolution on the determination 
of a situation under Article 39. Owing to the fact that the Security Council has 
exclusive power to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of 
the peace, or an act of aggression in an authentic and binding manner, a decision 

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30
 Cf., Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter. 
 
31
 See, Hailbronner—Klein: Article 10, 235–236.; Higgins, R.: The Development of 
International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations. London–New 
York–Toronto, 1963. 227–228. 
 
32
 For a similar position, see, Danish Institute of International Affairs: Humanitarian 
Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects. Copenhagen, 1999. 61.; Murphy, S. D.: 
Humanitarian Intervention. The United Nations in an Evolving World Order. Philadelphia, 
1996. 300. 
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of similar effect cannot be adopted by any other principal organ, not even the 
General Assembly. In absence of a determination under Article 39, it is after all 
irrelevant how the Council would qualify the given situation, therefore, the 
General Assembly can recommend the use of force in the event of a violation of 
human rights or fundamental guarantees of international humanitarian law. 
However, if the Council has previously qualified the atrocities as a threat to the 
peace, the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution cannot establish the legality of 
humanitarian intervention. It has to be emphasised that this “escape route” is 
presumably contrary to the requirement of bona fide exercise of rights; 
nevertheless, state practice does not completely refrain from solutions of such 
nature. Still I believe that if the states willing to intervene cannot obtain the 
indispensable authorisation from the Security Council, they should resort to the 
“Uniting for Peace” Resolution before they launch the attack. Despite that a 
recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the 
General Assembly will not necessarily secure legality, it would guarantee a great 
deal of legitimacy for the use of force. 
 
 
III. 
 
As I already mentioned above, the condition of the lawfulness of use of force 
is a prior and express authorisation by the Security Council under Chapter VII 
of the Charter. However, at the end of the 20th century, as a quasi abstraction 
of state practice, the idea according to which the authorisation does not have to 
be prior and express, but it can also appear in an implicit or an ex post facto 
form, gained ever increasing ground in the relevant literature. It is not 
astonishing that these “two variants” of Council authorisation not contained by 
the Charter have acquired great significance in connection with the legality of 
humanitarian intervention, as well.  
 Implicit authorisation, as the phrase itself indicates, does not assume an 
express form and is not issued in a separate resolution, but it does not imply 
total silence on the part of the Security Council either—its existence can be 
deduced from certain conclusive facts. But which facts attest that such an 
authorisation has been granted? First of all, one can infer from the text of 
earlier resolutions adopted with respect to the crisis concerned that this principal 
organ has implicitly authorised the use of force. An extremely important 
precondition is that the crisis, as expressly determined by the Council under 
Article 39, qualifies as a threat to international peace and security. Without 
such determination, furnishing evidence for an implicit authorisation is an 
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attempt committed to failure, since the bottom line for the adoption of measures 
under Chapter VII is the existence of a threat to the peace. Thus, despite 
the fact that on the basis of the theory of implicit authorisation, the “real” 
authorisation for the use of force is tacit, the determination under Article 39 
has to be explicit. 
 The determination of a threat to the peace by itself obviously constitutes an 
insufficient basis for proving that the Security Council has implicitly authorised 
the use of force. The chance of a successful argumentation is, consequently, 
greater in case the Council—following the determination—has taken provisional 
measures or non-forcible enforcement measures, as well. If recourse to Article 
41 has been inadequate, one may reasonably assume that the next logical step 
to be taken by the Council would be the application of Article 42. Sometimes 
even the Council itself stresses that it will consider “additional measures”, if 
non-forcible actions turn out to be inefficient.33 There is rational ground to 
believe that these “additional measures” refer to action pursuant to Article 42, 
although it cannot be excluded either, that by this phrase the Council speaks of 
other, more intensive coercive measures under Article 41, which—of course—
do not involve the use of force. 
 It can be seen that the resolutions of the Council leave room for divergent 
interpretations in this respect. For this reason, it can be useful to support the 
argument concerning the existence of an implicit authorisation with other 
sources, such as the statements of leading politicians of great powers, and acts 
of other organs of the UN, including the statements of the Secretary-General. 
As such, the demonstration of an implicit authorisation implies the enumeration 
and systematisation of a complex network of arguments. As a consequence, the 
argumentation can easily diverge into “arbitrary interpretation” and the 
construction of far-fetched theories. It needs to be admitted that the theory of 
implicit authorisation cannot be considered as being particularly persuasive, 
and accordingly, it receives little theoretical and practical support.34  
 The theory of ex post facto authorisation, according to which the authori-
sation by the Security Council to use force is not secured prior, but rather 
subsequent to the commencement of the military action, seems to be more 

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 For instance, regarding the Kosovo crisis, see, S.C. Res. 1199, 3930th mtg., 23 
September 1998, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998), para. 16. 
 
34
 For a rejecting view, see, Chinkin, C. M.: Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War? 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93. No. 4. (1999), 842–843.; Gray, C.: After 
the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of Force. British Yearbook of 
International Law (1994), 149.; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., 
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plausible. It must be noted that an alleged ex post facto authorisation also takes 
an implicit form, as if it were express, it would be considered as a “standard” 
authorisation. (As a result, these two “forms” of authorisation are sometimes 
treated in the literature as closely correlated,35 although, in my view, they can be 
distinguished theoretically on a temporal basis.) An ex post facto authorisation 
does not imply absolute idleness either; just as in the case of an implicit 
authorisation, its existence can be derived from conclusive facts or circum-
stances. Such facts are, for example, the absence of a resolution by the Council 
condemning the unauthorised use of force,36 possibly its express acceptance,37 
or the recognition of a situation arising in the wake of the use of force.38  
 The last one might be the most significant argument, as it is endowed with 
special authority by a fundamental norm of international law, according to 
which no territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression 
is or shall be recognised as lawful.39 Therefore, it cannot be disregarded if the 
Security Council—the sole organ capable of authentically determining that an 
act of aggression occurred—in a way recognises a situation created by an 
unauthorised use of force, that is, a prima facie act of aggression as lawful. 
This is closely related to the following provision of the General Assembly 
resolution on the Definition of Aggression: 
“The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter 
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the 
Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be 
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 Cf., Simma, B.: NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects. European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 10. No. 1. (1999), 10.; Wedgwood, R.: NATO’s 
Campaign in Yugoslavia. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93. No. 4. (October 
1999), 832. 
 
36
 See, e.g. Security Council: Belarus, India and the Russian Federation: Draft 
Resolution, 26 March 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/328. The draft resolution condemning the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo was dismissed by the Security Council by a 12:3 majority. 
 
37
 Concerning Liberia, see, e.g. Note by the President of the Security Council, 22 
January 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22133 (1991); Note by the President of the Security Council, 7 
May 1992, U.N. Doc. S/23886; S.C. Res. 788, 3138th mtg., 19 November 1992, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/788 (1992), preamble. 
 
38
 Concerning Kosovo, see, S.C. Res. 1244, 4011th mtg., 10 June 1999, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1244 (1999). 
 
39
 Cf., Definition of Aggression. G.A. Res. 3314, 2319th plen. mtg., 14 December 
1974, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX), Annex, Article 5(3). 
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justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that 
the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.”40 
In other words, the Security Council may qualify a unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention both as an act of aggression and as its opposite. Since the Definition of 
Aggression does not specify what form this determination should take, one 
might as well conclude that it could be implicit and ex post facto. It should be 
borne in mind that it is only the determination of the existence of an act of 
aggression that Article 39 of the Charter binds to the form of a resolution, 
whereas it does not provide for the determination of the absence thereof. 
Framing the absence of an act of aggression in a separate resolution is not only 
an unnecessary, but also a hazardous step. Hazardous, since the adoption of 
such resolution—in view of the fact that it is a substantive resolution—
presupposes the unanimity of the five permanent members. It is easy to predict 
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draft resolution concerned. Such result could easily be interpreted in a way that 
the rejection of the draft resolution equals the determination of an act of 
aggression, although this distorted interpretation would scarcely be in 
compliance with the content of Article 27, paragraph 3, or with Article 39. 
 The determination of the absence of an act of aggression by the Council 
probably implies “constructive” silence, or recognition of the situation thus 
arisen in a resolution. It does not imply, however, that the unilateral use of 
force was lawful. The Security Council may also qualify lawful actions as 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, therefore, its 
position does not necessarily reflect—albeit strongly indicates—the unlaw-
fulness of a conduct. Reversing this statement, one arrives at the conclusion 
that stillness on the part of the Council is not equal to the recognition of the 
legality of an action.41 This, to some extent, limits the plausibility of both the 
implicit and the express forms of ex post facto authorisation as means of 
subsequent acceptance of a unilateral action. This might be one of the reasons 
why the idea of ex post facto authorisation is not widely supported in the 
science of international law either.42 
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 Ibid., Article 2. 
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 Cf., Gray: op. cit., 163. 
 
42
 See, e.g. Charney, J. I.: Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo. American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 93. No. 4. (October 1999), 835.; Gray: op. cit., 163.; 
McWhinney, E.: The United Nations and a New World Order for a New Millennium. Self-
determination, State Succession, and Humanitarian Intervention. The Hague–London–
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IV. 
 
In the literature concerning humanitarian intervention we often encounter the 
view that the Charter does not forbid, on the contrary, it generally allows for 
such interventions even in absence of an authorisation by the Security Council. W. 
Michael Reisman expressly submitted that “the advent of the United Nations 
neither terminated nor weakened the customary institution of humanitarian 
intervention”, what is more, “the Charter strengthened and extended it”.43 
 The derivation of a right of humanitarian intervention from the Charter is 
primarily based on the restrictive interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 4, 
according to which this provision does not ban each and every form of the use 
or threat of force, as opposed to the generally accepted construction implying a 
comprehensive prohibition.44 The restrictive interpretation is, on the one hand, 
supported by the idea that Article 2, paragraph 4, “was never an independent 
ethical imperative of pacifism” and it gained its cogency “in the context of the 
Organization envisaged by the Charter and not as a moral postulate”,45 and on 
the other hand, by the circumstance that this particular section constitutes merely 
one of the elements of a complex collective security system, so it must be inter-
preted accordingly. For that reason, both the text of the article and the spirit of 
the Charter have to be taken into consideration in the course of interpretation.46 
 According to the restrictive interpretation, references to territorial integrity, 
political independence and the purposes of the United Nations in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, are not meant to secure the comprehensive nature of the 
prohibition, but to qualify and define the manifestations of force outlawed under 
the provision.47 Namely, these references can barely have a different function, 
assuming that the concerned parts of the text are not superfluous. Therefore, the 
three phrases cover three restrictions, as a consequence of which Article 2, 
                               
Boston, 2000. 74.; Ress, G.: Article 53, in Simma: The Charter of the United Nations. op. 
cit. 733–734. 
 
43
 Reisman: Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos. op. cit. 171. 
 
44
 See, e.g. Abiew: op. cit., 93–95.; Brenfors, M.—Petersen, M. M.: The Legality of 
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention—A Defence. Nordic Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 69. No. 4. (2000), 466–468.; Reisman: Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, 
177.; Tesón, F. R.: Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. Second 
Edition. Irvington-On-Hudson, 1997. 149–151. 
 
45
 Reisman, W. M.: Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4). 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 78. No. 3. (July 1984), 642. 
 
46
 See, ibid., 645. 
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 Cf., Stone, J.: Aggression and World Order. A Critique of United Nations Theories 
of Aggression. London, 1958. 95. 
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paragraph 4, qualifies “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations” as unlawful, but it does not encompass the 
forms of force beyond that scope. The argument would sound as follows: since 
humanitarian intervention is designed to stop grave and massive violations of 
human rights, it is conceptually excluded that it is directed against the territorial 
integrity or the political independence of the target state. If an intervention 
forcefully modifies the borders, or it is obviously directed at the destruction of 
the prevailing political order, it does not qualify as humanitarian intervention. 
The exemption of an intervention from the “political independence” clause can 
also be derived in another way. As human rights issues are no longer within the 
domestic jurisdictions of states as pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 7, the 
treatment of individuals by a state does not constitute a segment of “political 
independence” under Article 2, paragraph 4. Because both provisions are parts 
of the same whole, that is, the Charter, the modification of one notion obviously 
affects the other, as well.48 On that basis, humanitarian intervention does not fall 
within the effect of the first two qualifying phrases of Article 2, paragraph 4. 
 A similar conclusion can be reached upon the examination of the third 
phrase. The commitment to the “promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion”49 is mentioned among the purposes of the United Nations 
spelled out in Article 1 of the Charter. This commitment is also framed under 
Article 55(c) and Article 56, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, especially, if it is construed as an authentic interpretation of the Charter. 
The British Prime Minister, Mr. Clement Attlee, likewise affirmed the 
importance of this undertaking while opening the first plenary meeting of the 
General Assembly on January 10, 1946.50 
 The conclusion, therefore, that humanitarian intervention does not contradict 
the third phrase of Article 2, paragraph 4, seems believable, although the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the peaceful adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach 
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 Cf., Reisman, W. M.: Kosovo’s Antinomies. American Journal of International Law, 
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 See, Article 1, paragraph 3, of the UN Charter. 
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 See, Verbatim Record of the First Plenary Meeting, 10 January 1946, U.N. Doc. 
A/PV.1, 41. In a similar manner, see, Annan, K. A.: Standing Up for Human Rights. 
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of the peace are equally included among the purposes of the Organisation.51 As 
a matter of fact, humanitarian interventions explicitly promote the effective 
implementation of the purpose concerned, because they may prevent future 
acts of aggression.52 Finally, there exists a further, but less convincing theoretical 
way to prove that the use of force does not contradict the purposes of the 
United Nations. As Julius Stone submitted, Article 1 of the Charter does not 
necessarily establish additional legal obligations for the member states, but 
merely sets forth the purposes of the Organisation itself.53 
 A further interesting point is that the restrictive interpretation of Article 2, 
paragraph 4, has emerged not only in literature, but also in practice. Belgium, 
for instance, made the following statement in the proceedings before the ICJ 
with regard to NATO air operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1999: “The purpose of NATO's intervention is to rescue a people in peril, in 
deep distress. For this reason the Kingdom of Belgium takes the view that this 
is an armed humanitarian intervention, compatible with Article 2, paragraph 4, 
of the Charter, which covers only intervention against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of a State.”54 
 As I have already indicated, such interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 4, is 
an isolated view in the science of international law, and is not really supported 
by state practice either. Furthermore it is equally incommensurate with the 
travaux préparatoires, and the spirit and letter of the Charter. The most serious 
deficiency of the argument is that it identifies the territorial integrity of a state 
with the obligation to respect its borders. The reference to territorial integrity, 
however, must be interpreted as non-violability of the territory; consequently, 
an act of aggression, which transgresses the borders of a state, is in no case 
consistent with Article 2, paragraph 4.55 In view of such content, the whole 
theory is practically refuted—at least with respect to humanitarian inter-
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vention. (Even though the violation of territorial integrity does not occur in the 
hypothetical case of an intervention carried out in a res communis omnius usus 
territory, the injury arising from the coercion employed against the political 
independence of the target state, the attack against its armed forces, or a 
potential violation of the res communis omnium usus status all entail the 
unlawfulness of the action.) 
 Although, the restrictive interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 4, can be 
sufficiently challenged by the aforementioned counter-arguments concerning 
territorial integrity, the two other segments—that is political independence and 
the purposes of the UN—has to be briefly dwelled upon, as well. Whether or 
not political independence is violated by an intervention, depends on the 
meaning one attributes to this notion. If political independence is construed as 
the freedom of a government from external pressure or interference, all forms 
of humanitarian intervention will violate it, since it coerces the government 
into such behaviour, which contradicts its will. But if the concept is interpreted 
as the right of a people to freely determine the political system and the form of 
government, one is likely to arrive at a divergent conclusion.56 Faced with such 
a dilemma, an adequate answer is subject to the following, partly morally, partly 
legally implicated question: Is the despotic government satisfactory to the 
population and, primarily, to the victims of atrocities? In exercise of their right 
to a free choice of government, do they wish to sustain the oppressive regime? 
If the answer is positive, the intervention will violate political independence; if 
the answer is negative, it will not. (In the latter case, humanitarian intervention 
can with good reason be seen as “an extension of the domestic right to 
revolution”.57) Finally, if political independence is interpreted generally, as 
the existing political system of a state, the conclusion will, once again, be 
ambivalent. Although, humanitarian intervention is not meant to reshape the 
political system, and it merely wishes to impose certain behaviour on the target 
state, this objective cannot always be achieved without the overthrow of the 
government. It is worth noting that assuming the violation of political 
independence in a so-called “failed state”—that is, a state sunk into total 
anarchy—is senseless, since in such an entity no state power or political 
system, which could be violated by the use of force, exists. (Nevertheless, the 
territorial integrity of the target state and, therefore, Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Charter, still remain violable. The reason is that “territorial integrity” and 
“political independence” stand in a disjunctive relation in the text of the article.) 
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 By a logically constructed hierarchy among the purposes of the UN, one 
can effortlessly challenge the reasoning, according to which humanitarian inter-
vention is compatible with these purposes. As Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga 
wrote: “The context of the Charter demonstrates however that in the field of 
security, and with regard to the use of force, all other purposes of the United 
Nations are to be subordinated to the dominant one stated in Article 1, 
paragraph 1, which is “to maintain international peace and security.”58 
 Peace in a broader sense is certainly not equal to the absence of the use of 
armed force, as it also requires, inter alia, the observance of human rights. 
Nevertheless, it would be extremely risky to interpret this relationship in a way 
that the use of force for humanitarian purposes promotes peace, and thereby, 
the purposes of the UN in all cases. A mechanical presumption of this relation 
is admissible exclusively with respect to interventions authorised by the Security 
Council. 
 The contradictions residing in such reference to the purposes of the UN are 
excellently illustrated by the argument, according to which, if a deviation from 
Article 2, paragraph 4, is admissible in order to promote the protection of human 
rights as provided for under Article 1, paragraph 3, along the same logic, armed 
interventions for economic, social or cultural purposes would likewise qualify as 
lawful, since these potential grounds are also listed among the purposes of the 
Organisation and, in fact, set forth in the same section.59 The sole deficiency of 
this counter-argument is that economic, social and cultural matters, as opposed 
to human rights, have remained predominantly a part of domaine réservé. 
 The Preamble of the Charter is also frequently invoked for the justification 
of humanitarian intervention. The second sentence of the Preamble states that 
“the peoples of the United Nations” are determined “to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women”. In the subsequent paragraphs, the intention to 
prevent the use of armed force is also framed, but with an important exception: 
“save in the common interest”. To ensure respect for fundamental human rights, 
primarily by reason of their connection to international peace and security, is 
probably a legitimate “common interest”. Since the Preamble contains the 
general purposes of the Charter, a number of authors think that the legality of 
the use of force for humanitarian purposes can be derived from its formu-
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lation.60 Such actions, as a result of the connection referred to above, seem to 
simultaneously promote the enforcement of the purposes of the UN, both in 
terms of the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, 
and of the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights. 
 The opinion, according to which the lawfulness of intervention can be 
grounded on the Preamble, is very poorly supported, thus, it chiefly serves as a 
supplementary argument, for instance, to the restrictive interpretation of Article 
2, paragraph 4. Despite that the Preamble is an integral part of the Charter, it 
does not stipulate independent obligations for the members, but enumerates 
the reasons, motives and general ends necessitating the adoption thereof. 
Accordingly, the practical relevance of the Preamble is extremely insignificant; 
so far it has barely been referred to.61 The theory also fails to answer the 
question: Who or what is entitled to establish that a case of “common interest” 
exists with respect to the use of force? In view of the spirit and letter of the 
Charter, this power seems to be assigned to the Security Council. Therefore, 
recourse to the use of force on grounds of “common interest” is permissible only 
in possession of a prior and express authorisation by the Council. 
 Since Article 106 of the Charter62 frequently appears in analyses concerning 
the legality of the use of force,63 I think it also needs to be investigated, if this 
provision can justify humanitarian intervention in the absence of an authori-
sation by the Security Council. In spite of the fact that its deletion has also 


 
60
 See, Reisman: Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos. op. cit. 172. 
 
61
 See, Wolfrum, R.: Preamble, in Simma: The Charter of the United Nations. op. cit. 
48. According to Kelsen, the Preamble constitutes an integral part of the Charter, so it 
virtually has “the same legal validity” as other provisions of the Charter. However, by 
reason of its content, the Preamble does not establish obligations, and “has rather an 
ideological than a legal importance”. See, Kelsen: The Law of the United Nations. op. 
cit. 9. 
 
62
 Article 106 of the UN Charter: “Pending the coming into force of such special agree-
ments referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin 
the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation 
Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion 
requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on 
behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security.” 
 
63
 Cf., e.g. Schachter, O.: Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and 
Regional Organizations, in Damrosch, L. F.—Scheffer, D. J. (ed.): Law and Force in the 
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arisen as a demand,64 under certain circumstances, Article 106 could ground the 
lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. Though it merely establishes an 
obligation for the permanent members of the Security Council to consult, it can 
theoretically lead to the taking of a “joint action”. As both the context of the 
article and references to Articles 42 and 43 therein reflect, joint action implies 
military action.65 
 The permissibility of the use of force under Article 106, however, has 
several conditions. In the first place, one should mention the time factor, 
because the stipulation, as a result of the conditions incorporated therein, is 
of provisional nature: it expires as soon as the Security Council, after the 
conclusion of agreements envisaged in Article 43, has sufficient armed force—
both in quantity and in quality—at its disposal to take enforcement measures 
under Article 42. The determination of this circumstance presupposes a 
resolution by the Security Council, and at least one agreement concluded under 
Article 43. Since such agreements have not been concluded so far, Article 106 
has been in force since 1945, although, it barely has practical relevance. 
 The next, implicit condition, which is the most difficult to comply with, is 
the unanimity of the five permanent members. The use of force under this 
article can take place only in case of a consensus among the permanent 
members of the Security Council; thus Article 106 does not prevent veto. This 
conclusion can be drawn from the fact that such actions would be implemented 
“on behalf of the Organization”. The requirement of unanimity, however, does 
not entail that the five states would be bound to actively participate in a joint 
action.66 Again, it has to be emphasised that Article 106 only establishes an 
obligation for the permanent members to consult, not “to agree” or “to act”. A 
further implicit condition is that the use of force necessitates a determination by 
the Security Council under Article 39, and a conviction that the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security requires such an extreme 
measure. Therefore, joint action, despite its prima facie self-authorising 
character, does not constitute an independent exception to the prohibition of 
the use of force. Nevertheless, Article 106 is inapplicable if the Council 
authorises the members or international organisations to use force.67 
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V. 
 
The demonstration or refusal of customary lawfulness is a permanent element 
of scientific disputes concerning humanitarian intervention. It is not at all 
accidental that this issue has gained outstanding relevance. In view of a possible 
veto in the Security Council, as well as the challengeable nature of other 
methods or theories aimed at the demonstration of the legality of humanitarian 
intervention, customary law can be considered the sole source of international 
law, from which the derivation of a right of humanitarian intervention seems to 
be feasible. The scientific significance of views based on customary law is 
remarkably enhanced by references to traditional international law, that is, by 
arguing that such right had existed in customary law for centuries. So far as an 
author resolves to prove the customary lawfulness of humanitarian intervention 
in the post-Second World War period, the most evident solution is to derive it 
from the variously explicable and extremely vague traditional law. If he also 
manages to prove that the entry into force of the UN Charter has not affected 
the continued existence of this customary right, his endeavours are likely to 
end in success. If, however, someone wishes to demonstrate that a customary 
right of humanitarian intervention no longer prevails in the present era of 
international law, he should claim that it either never constituted a segment of 
international law, or, even if it did, its relevance and raison d’être completely 
vanished as a result of the development of law in the first half of the 20th 
century. As such, the customary law of the past can barely be construed as a 
mere curiosity of legal science in this respect. 
 Naturally, both extremes are represented in the literature. Several eminent 
scholars claim that the customary right of humanitarian intervention has 
“survived” the beginning of the new era marked by the adoption of the 
Charter, and it still exists. Therefore, humanitarian intervention is lawful, even 
if it is carried out in absence of a prior and express authorisation. But the 
overwhelming majority of international lawyers believe that such right does 
not exist, and if it had ever existed, the Charter ultimately terminated it. In my 
view, a definitive conclusion pertaining to the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention under traditional customary law can scarcely be drawn, because 
the essential opinio iuris cannot be unequivocally demonstrated. The spirit of 
19th century international law suggests the legality of humanitarian inter-
vention; however, this spirit is most likely to have gradually altered at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that a 
customary right of humanitarian intervention, which had prevailed for over a 
century, ceased to exist in the period between the two World Wars. By reason 
of the uncertainties concerning traditional international law, I do not consider 
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the derivation of a contemporary customary right of intervention from the past 
as an expedient solution. Furthermore, I think that even if such right had been 
in existence prior to 1945, it could by no means “survive” the entry into force 
of the Charter. 
 However, it is not only traditional international law from which a contemporary 
customary right of humanitarian intervention might be drawn. Given that one 
encounters such interventions even in the UN-era, it has to be contemplated, 
whether the practice of states and international organisations could have 
created a new customary right of humanitarian intervention, either “from 
nothing” or by reviving the relevant norm of traditional international law.68 (It 
has to be noted that in the latter case the continued existence of an alleged past 
customary right of humanitarian intervention cannot be conceived, since the 
present hypothesis implies that lawfulness, if it had existed, was disrupted after 
the Second World War. Accordingly, there must have been a period, in which 
humanitarian intervention qualified as an unlawful action, even if one assumes 
that previously it had been a lawful conduct.) 
 Naturally, the simultaneous coexistence of the two constitutive elements of 
customary law—notably, state practice and opinio iuris—is indispensable for 
the evolution of an old-new customary right of intervention. The demonstration 
of the existence of state practice seems less problematic, since the use of force 
for humanitarian purposes has occurred several times since 1945 (e.g., in 
East Pakistan, Cambodia, Uganda, the Central African Empire, Liberia, 
Northern and Southern Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia). Yet, the question here is how we assess these actions. 
Obviously, the practice of humanitarian intervention exists only if it is 
constituted by such interventions. Due to the absence of a generally accepted 
definition of humanitarian intervention, opinions vary regarding the 
humanitarian quality of particular interventions. It is always easier to prove 
that a military operation has “dishonest”—for example, political or economic—
goals, than to show that its commencement was indeed dictated by humanitarian 
considerations. So it appears that the presumption is against the altruistic 
nature of the use of force, so far as unauthorised actions are concerned. It is, 
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therefore, not accidental that states apparently refrain from the designation of 
their unilateral actions as humanitarian interventions, even if these could be 
qualified as such. On the other hand, in the context of undoubtedly humanitarian 
and lawful interventions, the issue of differentiation may be a source of significant 
problems. A large segment of the practice of humanitarian intervention can be 
effortlessly disregarded, if one does not classify the given actions as such, but 
consider them as enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, or as 
peace-keeping—more precisely, peace-enforcement—missions. The classification 
is appropriate even in this case, however, these broader categories are able to 
dissolve the category of authorised humanitarian interventions, which relates 
to them as a part to a whole, and thereby to reduce the number of such 
actions. Last, but not least, the demonstration of state practice is impeded by 
the selectivity and the sporadic nature of interventions, as well. The latter 
circumstance can be attributed not only to the reluctance of the states to act, 
but also to the infrequent occurrences of exceptionally blatant human rights 
violations necessitating the use of force. 
 One has to take a negative position concerning the existence of opinio 
iuris.69 This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the peremptory 
character of the prohibition of the use of force, and from the fact that the 
content of this principle is essentially equivalent to the content of Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter. Furthermore, both the behaviour of members of 
the international community and the declarations made by various international 
bodies indicate the absence of opinio iuris.70 Consequently, it is more likely—
as opposed to what I have submitted above—that the reason why states are 
reluctant to qualify their unilateral actions as humanitarian interventions is that 
they are convinced that such quality, by itself, is not a legal title, and cannot 
establish lawfulness. 
 The evolution of customary law is, however, a fairly long process. The fact 
that no customary right of humanitarian intervention exists today does not 
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imply that it may not develop in the future. If respect for human rights received 
such distinguished attention in the future as nowadays and, according to all 
indications, it will, I would not venture to state that a right of humanitarian 
intervention will never constitute an exception to the prohibition of the use of 
force. However, I would not declare it with absolute certainty either. On the one 
hand, the direction of future development of international law is uncertain, but 
state sovereignty will always be a determining element. On the other hand, 
humanitarian intervention can arise as an exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force only on condition that it acquires a cogent nature, as peremptory 
norms of general international law can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
having the same character—but this is an extremely unlikely possibility for the 
time being. Thirdly, and I think, this is the main counter-argument, no such 
exception is necessary. Today, there are more or less adequately operating 
mechanisms applicable to remedy “common” violation of human rights. But a 
similar statement surprisingly seems valid even with respect to extremely grave 
and widespread violations: according to my opinion, Chapter VII of the Charter 
contains the solution. The legal framework is given; its utilisation is merely a 
question of political will. Besides, it is a mistake to assume that the emergence 
of a customary right of humanitarian intervention would solve the problem 
once for all. Firstly, it would establish merely a right, but not an obligation to 
enforce respect for human rights by the use of force, so it would be unable to 
eliminate selectivity. Secondly, it would inescapably create several opportunities 
for abuse. 
 At the same time, it cannot be excluded that a customary right of humani-
tarian intervention has entered the first phase of its evolution. Antonio Cassese 
was presumably referring to that, when he stated that the opinio necessitatis 
concerning the NATO intervention in the Kosovo crisis—typically considered 
as a humanitarian intervention—“has been widespread and seems to be in the 
process of crystallizing; however this has not gone unopposed”.71 It is 
noteworthy that Cassese does not imply either that a customary right of 
humanitarian intervention has emerged (he emphasises that international law, 
outside the framework of the Charter, does not authorise such actions), how-
ever, there is general agreement concerning the necessity of the institution. The 
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, similarly expressed himself rather 
cautiously, when he said: “Emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an inter-
national norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must 
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take precedence over concerns of State sovereignty.”72 But the Secretary-
General did not say either that this norm would grant states carte blanche for 
the use of force for humanitarian purposes. On the contrary, in his speeches, 
he consistently argues for the indispensable role of the United Nations, and 
particularly, the Security Council.73  
 
 
VI. 
 
With the acquisition of a cogent character by a few human rights and by the 
fundamental guarantees of international humanitarian law, such peremptory 
norms of international law have come into existence, the significance of which 
can reasonably be compared to that of the “traditional” norms of ius cogens, 
including the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-
intervention.74 Therefore, it is understandable that the idea of a conflict of 
cogent norms has also emerged with respect to the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention. Namely, the possibility that, at the core of the problems related to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, there is a conflict between the cogent 
obligation to respect human rights and fundamental guarantees of humanitarian 
law and the equally cogent prohibition of the use of force. So far as this alleged 
conflict is resolved in favour of the obligation to respect human rights, it seems 
that the prohibition of the use of force cannot prevent the commencement of 
unilateral military actions for humanitarian purposes. 
 Prima facie, the theory is undoubtedly pleasing and, in view of the 
statements in literature and in practice concerning the primacy of human rights 
over state sovereignty, it might appear to be sufficiently grounded. In fact, such 
conflict does not exist, and cannot even come into existence. The principal 
reason is that the groups of subjects respectively obliged by the peremptory 
norms concerned are different in the case of humanitarian intervention. The 
obligation to respect human rights and guarantees of international humanitarian 
law binds the potential target state, whereas the prohibition of the use of force 
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binds the states or international organisations willing to intervene in absence of 
an authorisation by the Security Council. Furthermore, a conflict is also ruled 
out by the fact that these peremptory norms similarly prescribe an obligation to 
refrain from a certain conduct, so they cannot interfere with one another. The 
first norm obliges subjects of international law to refrain from the infringement 
of human rights or international humanitarian law, whereas the second norm 
obliges them to refrain from the unauthorised use of force, with the exception 
of self-defence. One could speak of a conflict of norms only if an obligation to 
enforce respect for human rights and fundamental guarantees of humanitarian 
law—that is to say, an active conduct—appeared instead of the obligation to 
respect these rights and guarantees. (In this case, even the groups of subjects 
obliged would be the same.) However, none of the peremptory norms of 
international law oblige states or international organisations to secure respect 
for these rights and guarantees in another state by the use of force. Neither 
does a norm of ius cogens providing a right for that exists. 
 But a conflict of norms would not be likely, even if such a rule existed. If 
a cogent obligation to enforce respect for human rights and fundamental 
guarantees of international humanitarian law emerged, the content of the 
prohibition of the use of force, rather than the obligation to respect these 
rights and guarantees would change. In other words: a new and independent 
peremptory norm would not come into existence, but an already existing norm 
would be modified. The modification would occur within the framework of 
one single norm, that is, the prohibition of the use of force, thereby excluding 
the possibility of a conflict of different norms. The normative effect of the 
prohibition of the use of force is not affected in any way by the obligation to 
respect human rights and fundamental guarantees of international humanitarian 
law applicable to non-international armed conflicts. As a result, the argument 
under deliberation cannot ground the lawfulness of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention.75 
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Conclusions 
 
As a short summary of the present analysis, it can be stated that an adequate 
recommendation by the General Assembly might be suitable to ground the 
lawfulness of an unauthorised humanitarian intervention, although this pre-
sumption is far from being unchallengeable, as the Charter also allows for an 
interpretation, which categorically excludes this alternative. The applicability 
of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution is equally dubious, partly by reason of 
the debates concerning its legality, partly due to the criteria set for the adoption 
of a recommendation on the use of force. Furthermore, neither an alleged 
implicit, nor an ex post facto Security Council authorisation can legalise a 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, because both lacks sufficient basis in 
the Charter. Comparing these two theoretical constructions, ex post facto 
authorisation seems more convincing, since it is more or less firmly justifiable, 
as opposed to an implicit authorisation. Nevertheless, it would be a daring 
statement that either of these could substitute a prior and express authorisation, 
and ground the legality of humanitarian intervention. 
 A similarly negative conclusion can be drawn upon the examination of the 
text of the Charter. A thorough study of the document reveals that a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention cannot be derived from any of the provisions 
of the Charter—the only possible exception being Article 106 concerning “joint 
actions”, although its relevance is rather theoretical, than practical. It explains 
why the proponents of intervention on the grounds of humanity, who generally 
resort to all possible instruments and arguments to support their case, 
remarkably ignore this article. Finally, the lawfulness of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention can neither be justified on the basis of present customary law, nor 
by a hypothetical conflict of peremptory norms of international law. 
 Hence humanitarian intervention by no means constitutes a “third” exception 
to the prohibition of the use of force, and is not to be classified as an 
autonomous legal title. It is undoubtedly lawful in only one case: if it is 
commenced in possession of a prior and express authorisation by the Security 
Council. In the rest of the cases, however, the presumption is in favour of 
illegality. Given the sometimes unsatisfactory activity of the Council and 
the constant risk of a veto, this “orthodox” conclusion may appear to be 
disillusioning and insufficient. From another point of view, however, both the 
necessary legal framework—that is, Chapter VII of the Charter—and the 
required state and organisational capacity seem to be present for the use of 
force by the international community against governments, which tread upon 
human rights. An effective utilisation of these means, nevertheless, depends on 
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the actual political will of states, therefore it would be unwise to attribute 
anomalies thus emerging exclusively to a fault of legal regulation, but it would 
be an even greater error to seek a solution in its fundamental and irresponsible 
modification. 
 
 
 
 
